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A variety of regulations may affect commercial fish catches.  We take here as a case in 
point steps to reduce losses of aquatic organisms due to impingement and entrainment 
(I&E) at power plants.  Methods to evaluate the benefits of such measures are needed for 
benefit-cost analysis.  We use a new approach to estimating ex vessel demand by Holt 
and Bishop (2002) to address the portion of the benefits that occur post-harvest, that is, 
down the marketing chain after fishermen sell their catches.  The model deals with the 
dockside prices and quantities for six major commercial species harvested from the U.S. 
Great Lakes.  We use the model to explore the potential magnitude of post-harvest 
benefits for Great Lakes fisheries.  We then turn to a possible approach to benefits 
transfer for cases where such a model is not available.  A semi-realistic case example 




When fish catches increase as a result of regulations, benefits may accrue through the 
production and marketing chain that begins with those who supply inputs to fishermen 
and ends with final consumers.  This paper is concerned with methods of measuring the 
post-harvest welfare effects that may accrue to fish wholesalers, retailers, and final 
consumers.  Using a model of ex vessel fishing demand by Holt and Bishop (2002), we 
explore potential methods of estimating these effects for Great Lakes fish and draw 
implications for benefits transfer. 
 
The analysis is motivated in part by a real world policy issue.  Changes in cooling water 
intake structures and other steps at power plants can reduce impingement and entrainment 
of aquatic organisms (hereafter referred to I&E losses) at power plants, but at a cost.  
Reducing I&E losses could have many benefits, including the benefits associated with 
increased commercial fish harvests.   
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State University. At the outset, we will examine post-harvest benefits in a simple conceptual model that 
will help us account for a full set of commercial use benefits and provide a context for the 
rest of the paper.  Then we will turn our attention to possible empirical methods for 
estimating post-harvest benefits using the Holt-Bishop model.  This will demonstrate how 
the model could be used to estimate post-harvest benefits from increases in Great Lakes 
catches.  Obviously the fish harvesters themselves and those who supply them with inputs 
may also benefit, but we will not delve into empirical procedures for evaluating benefits 
to fishermen and their suppliers here.  The paper will conclude by laying out an approach 
to benefits transfer, with an application to the Great Lakes. 
 
The Conceptual Model 
Figure 1 is a simple supply and demand model that will illustrate how an increase in 





















1   
 
P
2   






Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Benefits from an Increase in Fish Catch 
 
convention of modeling fish demand as an inverse demand system, where the price, P, is 
a function, P(F), and F is the output of fish to this market.  We take this to be the 
dockside or ex-vessel demand.  An inverse demand function is used because fish are 
perishable and must be marketed soon after they are caught.  Hence, price is driven by 
quantity rather than vice versa in the short run.  For simplicity, we assume that this 
fishery is managed on a quota basis where the current quota is F
1 so that the ex-vessel 
price is P
1.  Assuming a quota makes the story simple.  Roughly the same principles 
apply under other management regimes, such as closed seasons and gear restrictions, 
since the goal is usually the same, that is to limit total catch.  Average cost is equal to 
marginal cost at C, again by assumption.  A more complicated model could have an 
upward sloping marginal cost function.   
 
Consider P(F) for a moment.  This is not the demand for a finished product, but for an 
intermediate good, fish that have just been harvested.  What does it tell us about social 
  2welfare?  Let us assume that the markets down the marketing chain from fish harvesters 
to final consumers are competitive and adjust quickly to changes in dockside supply and 
that none of the demand functions at successive stages is perfectly elastic.  This will 
allow us to expect that P(F) will reflects the dockside prices that would prevail after all 
the downstream markets have adjusted.  Hence, P(F) is not a Marshallian demand 
function, since all other prices down the processing and marketing chain and across the 
compliments and substitutes for the fish species in question would not be held constant if 
the supply of that fish species would change.  Rather P(F) is a “general equilibrium 
demand function” (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 1982; Thurman and Easley, 1992) 
expressing the prices of F that would prevail after markets in the rest of the economy 
have adjusted to changes in F.  As the derived demand for F, it represents the maximum 
marginal willingness to pay for F by processors, marketers, and final consumers.  To the 
extent that firms down the marketing chain will earn rents at the margin and consumers 
will earn consumer surplus at the margin as F changes, their marginal values would be 
reflected in P(F).  And the definition of the so-called welfare triangles under P(F) is a bit 
broader than is usual in textbook examples, which deal with final demand.  Here, the 
welfare triangle includes not only consumer surplus but also post-harvest rents.
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So let’s consider the welfare implications of catching F
1 of fish.  Total benefits from this 
fishery at F
1 are given by Area T+U+V+W.  Fish harvesters earn total revenue equal to 
U+V+W.  W is the total input costs, leaving rents to fish harvesters of Area U+V.  Area T 
represents consumer surplus and post-harvest rents to firms down the marketing chain.   
 
As we noted at the outset, we will not deal empirically with costs or rents to fish 
harvesters.  Nevertheless, we will want to keep track of them conceptually in accounting 
for benefits.  It is well known that theory predicts zero rents to fishery resources under 
open access.  However, there could still be rents in the fishery for two reasons.  One is 
that if the quota of F
1 is allocated to fishing firms as individual quotas, then the fishery 
would no longer be operating under open access.
4  Second, even if rents to the resource 
are zero, there could still be rents to other resources such as scarce fishing skills.  Thus, 
we will allow positive rents to be a possibility in accounting for benefits. 
 
Now suppose that the quota is increased to F
2.  For example, remedial steps that reduce 
fish losses due to I&E might increase the harvestable surplus of fish.  Let us do the 




                                                
In step 1, we assess the net benefits for consumers and downstream firms.  With 
an increase in quantity from F
1 to F
2 and a decline in price from P
1 to P
2, 
consumers and downstream producers gain U + X.   
In step 2, let’s assess the net benefits to harvesters.  Their total revenue is now 
Area V+W+Y+Z.  Hence the change in total revenue is Area Y + Z – U, which 
 
3 As is well known, the welfare triangles associated with P(F) are not “exact” welfare measures because of 
possible income effects.  We do not bother to address that issue explicitly here, but the empirical results 
presented below do involve estimates of “exact” measures of welfare. 
4 Or the quota could be enforced by at tax of t per unit caught where t = P
1 – C, with the rents going to the 
taxing entity. 
  3could be positive or negative. Costs increase by Area Z.  Hence, the change in 
rents associated with fish harvesting is Y –U, which again could be positive or 
negative.  Consumer surplus and downstream rents become Area T+U+X. 
In step 3, we calculate the increase in net social benefits when the quota increases 
from F
1 to F
2 by adding the results of steps 1 and 2, which leaves Area X+Y.  
Area U does not result in an increase in total benefits because it is merely a 
transfer from harvesters to downstream firms and consumers and cancels out.   
• 
 
This framework helps conceptualize what we want to do in the rest of this paper.  In the 
next section, we will explore what Step 1 might look like for an actual benefit-cost 
analysis using the Holt-Bishop model of Great Lakes demand.  Our estimates will be the 
conceptual equivalent of Area U + X in this simple model.  Steps 2 and 3 of the process 
suggested in the preceding paragraph would require data on fishing costs, which will not 
be addressed here.   
 
Next, we will consider an approach to benefits transfer that is suggested by the simple 
model.  It may not be feasible to do an empirical demand model for each case where 
changes in I&E losses due to new regulations need to be evaluated or other steps are 
taken that increase supply.  If one wanted to try to use the results of an actual empirical 
study in one region of the country to get a rough estimate of what downstream rents plus 
consumer surplus would be for fisheries in another region where no empirical analysis 
exists, how might one proceed?  One approach would be to start with total revenues of 
fish harvesters.  Since most significant commercial fisheries are regulated, there are often 
data available to estimate the ex-vessel value of catches.   
 
Suppose for the time being that Figure 1 represents the situation for the Great Lakes as 
reflected in an actual empirical study.  We know total revenue at baseline, which is equal 
to Area U+V+W.  We can use the empirical model to predict price and the associated 
increase in post-harvest benefits that will result from an increase in catch.  For example, 
we already saw in Figure 1 how an increase in catch to F
2 would result in a price of P
2 
and an associated increase in post-harvest benefits of Area U+X.  Let K
2 equal the ratio 
of this increase in downstream rents plus consumer surplus to total revenues of the 
fishery, where 2 is a superscript, not an exponent.  That is, K
2 = (Area U + X)/(Area U + 
V + W).  (The superscript 2 signifies that this is the value of the ratio K associated with 
an increase in catch to F
2.) 
 
Now let’s carry the approach a step farther in the following way.  Let us think of F
1, the 






1.  We could do this for other values of F, say F
3, F
4, and so on.  Likewise, 








1, and so on.  And associated with each 
L would be a K, K
2, K
3, K
4, and so on, expressing the change in post-harvest benefits 
associate with each F, expressed as a proportion of baseline total revenue. Using our 
empirical model in Figure 1, we could consider alternative values of F and each 
associated value of L and K until we had traced out a function, K = K(L). Each value of 
L, the proportional increase in catch, would be associated with a proportional increase in 
  4benefits.  This function would be empirically based on the Great Lakes fishery as 
depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Now consider a fishery in another area, perhaps a coastal fishery.  Before the intervention 
in question, the other fishery has total revenues, which we will symbolize as R, the ex 
vessel value of the catch there.  Symbolize the catch in this new fishery as G, and 
suppose the intervention (e.g., I&E remediation) will lead to an increase in the quota 
there from G
1 to G
2.  Let Q = (G
2 – G
1)/G
1.  The benefits transfer approach we propose 
would calculate K = K(Q), where K(.) is still based empirically on the Great Lakes 
situation in Figure 1.  Then one would estimate the resulting increase in post-harvest 
rents plus consumer surplus for the costal fish as K(Q)*R.   
 
The next step is to examine the Holt-Bishop model and consider possible magnitudes of 
downstream rents and consumer surplus from some hypothesized changes in Great Lakes 
catches.  This will allow us to explore the magnitudes of K(L) for typical Great Lakes 
species and eventually to consider the efficacy of our proposed approach to benefits 
transfer. 
 
Valuing Increases is Catch Using the Holt-Bishop Model 
There have been numerous efforts over the years to estimate the demand for fish.  Well-
known examples from the published literature include Barten and Bettendorf (1989), 
Thurman and Easley (1992), Eales, Durham, and Wessells (1997), and Beach and Holt 
(2001).  Our paper (Holt and Bishop, 2002) was our attempt to improve the methods 
available by adapting the work of Diewert and Wales (1988a, 1988b) to inverse demand 
systems. 
 
The Holt-Bishop model is a “semiflexible normalized quadratic inverse demand system.”  
It is flexible in the sense that, within limits, it allows the estimated demand functions to 
be shaped to better fit the data, but it is semiflexible in that it imposes enough structure to 
meet the curvature conditions of microeconomic theory, a desirable property in a model 
to be used in welfare analysis.  Our demand system is quadratic to allow for non-linear 
demand functions if the data call for them.  An inverse demand system is used to capture 
the fact that, for highly perishable fish products, prices are endogenously determined 
based on landings.  It is a demand system in that six demand functions for different fish 
species were estimated simultaneously.  The demand system is normalized to address 
technical issues that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The model was estimated for six types of fish landed at Great Lakes ports in the U.S.  
These included lake whitefish, lake trout, yellow perch, lake herring, chubs, and smelt.  
Though many other fish are caught from the Great Lakes, these six account for a large 
share of the catch in terms of value.  For example, in 1999, the last year for which data 
have been published, these six species accounted for more the 92 percent of the Great 
Lakes commercial catch in dollars. Other species typically have low prices and/or are 
caught in smaller quantities.   
 
  5We started with monthly data for the period 1971 through 1991.  Monthly catches and 
prices were combined into bimonthly values to avoid the problem of very small catches 
in some months.  A summary of the data can be found in Holt and Bishop (2002, Table 
1).  The amount of variation in the data was sufficient to allow us to ferret out the 
demand relationships across the six types of fish.   And it turned out that our model fit the 
data quite well and outperformed the popular Almost Ideal Demand System across 
several criteria when the latter was fitted to the same data set. 
 
For purposes of this paper, we applied the model as estimated in Holt and Bishop (2002) 
to estimate the post-harvest welfare implication of increases in two of the Great Lakes 
most important species, lake whitefish and yellow perch, with the results displayed in 
Tables 1 and 2 respectively.  Figures in the table are for average conditions between 1971 
and the end of 1991.  In both tables, compensating variation (post-harvest benefits) was 
estimated for 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent increases in catch.  These percentages, 
as expressed in the first column of the tables, are the analogue of the proportional 
increases in catches, L, in the conceptual model discussed in the preceding section.  For 
example, in Table 1, we estimated that at L = 5 percent for whitefish, post-harvest 
compensating variation would increase by $292,000 after rounding.  Likewise, in Table 
2, at L = 10 percent for yellow perch, post-harvest welfare would increase by about 
$265,000. 
 












1%   $     5,657,206   $      58,342   1.0%
5%   $     5,657,206   $     291,539  5.2%


















1%   $     3,025,070    $      26,524   0.9%
5%   $     3,025,070    $     132,493   4.4%
10%   $     3,025,070    $     264,667   8.7%
 
 
The right-hand percent columns in the two tables show compensating variation as a 
percentage of the dockside value of the catch before the hypothetical increases occurred.  
These figures are the analogue of K for the simple model.  That is, for example, if L = 10 
percent for yellow perch, K = 8.7 percent. 
 
  6For both whitefish and perch, the relationship K(L) is very close to being linear and is 
slightly steeper for whitefish.  The slope for whitefish is approximately unity, while the 
slope for perch is approximately 0.9. 
 
The estimates of K for lake whitefish and yellow perch are more or less typical of the 
Great Lakes commercial species included in the model.  For example, under average 
conditions, for a 10 percent reduction in catch as considered in Table 8 of Holt and 
Bishop (2002), K ranged from about 8 percent for smelt to 12.12 percent for chubs for a 
weighted average of 10.03 percent.  Hence, for the Great Lakes, we propose that K = 
K(L) can be approximated by K = L for relatively small changes in catches.  That is, at 
least for the Great Lakes species included in the Holt-Bishop model, the change in post-
harvest rents and consumer welfare as a percentage of ex vessel value is estimated to be, 
on average, approximately equal to the percentage change in catch. 
 
Now, if K = L holds to a reasonable approximation for the major Great Lakes species, 
would such a relationship be suitable for benefits transfer to other species and regions?  
Admittedly, this is a purely pragmatic approach.  Beyond saying that as similar products, 
fish products might have similar demand structures, there is no theoretical reason to 
suppose that post-harvest changes in welfare, as a percentage of dockside value, should 
be similar across fisheries.  The consistency across Great Lakes species is encouraging in 
this regard, but it is hardly conclusive.  But there is encouraging evidence about the 
robustness of this relationship.  Beach and Holt (2001) estimated a model very similar to 
Holt and Bishop (2002) for nine types of fish in the South Atlantic region.  The weighted 
average value of K for a 10 percent reduction in catch was very close to 10 percent, 
which would further support the case for K = L.  At this point, the only other study that 
we have found that would provide a point of comparison involved red drum in the Gulf of 
Mexico, where Thurman and Easley (1992, p. 236) estimated that post-harvest welfare 
would by 6 percent for a 10 percent reduction in catch.  This would indicate that K = L 
might not be as robust across fisheries as we would like, but more research is needed 
before much more can be said.   
 
Implications for Benefits from I&E Remediation   
For any of the species covered in the Holt-Bishop model, estimation of post-harvest 
benefits would be relatively straightforward.  Beyond running the model and reviewing 
the results for changes in circumstances since 1991 (when the data set ended), only minor 
steps like allowing for inflation and discounting would be needed. 
 
On the other hand, if the analysis needed to address a species or an area not covered by 
the model and original research is not feasible, benefits transfer would be necessary.  We 
can illustrate how this would work using a Great Lakes example. 
 
U.S. EPA’s estimates of I&E losses at the Monroe and J.R. Whiting power plants on 
Lake Erie are presented in Table 3.  These estimates were developed for the 2002 
Proposed Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule. EPA developed these 
estimates using I&E data collected by the Monroe and J.R. Whiting power plants in the 
  71970s and extrapolated the estimates of I&E at all in-scope facilities based on average 
daily flow at all Great Lakes facilities affected by the rule. EPA will be revising the set of 
facilities defined to be in the Great Lakes region and the estimated I&E impacts in the 
analysis for the final Phase II rule. Thus, these results are used for illustrative purposes 
only. Full details on the methods used to estimate I&E impacts are provided in the Case 
Study Document for the proposed rule (U.S. EPA, 2002). 
 
Table 3: Estimated Commercial Harvest Lost from Impingement and Entrainment in the 
Great Lakes Under Conditions Assumed in the EPA Analysis (pounds per year) 
 
Species 
Estimated I&E Losses at 
J.R. Whiting and Monroe 
Estimated I&E Losses at all 
Great Lakes In-Scope 
Facilities 
Bullhead 52  206 
Channel catfish  767  1,518 
Common carp  239,478  949,180 
Gizzard shad  2,555,854  10,130,218 
Sucker spp.  1,233  4,887 
White bass  115,827  229,544 
Burbot 206  408 
Freshwater drum  19,148  75,894 
Smelt 810  1,605 
Whitefish 73  143 
 
 
Two species that were included in the Holt-Bishop analysis appear on this list, whitefish 
and smelt.  However, the quantities of both species are too small to affect the prices 
much, if at all, so the Holt-Bishop model is not directly applicable to this problem.  The 
other species in the list are not included in the Holt-Bishop model and, hence, would need 
to be valued using benefits transfer.  If the figures in Table 3 were final estimates, how 
might benefits transfer work? 
 
Carp, gizzard shad, suckers, and freshwater drum are relatively abundant species that are 
variously referred to as rough fish or underutilized species.  Their production is much 
more limited by markets than by biological abundance.  This is reflected in their dockside 
values, which averaged $0.09, $0.04, $0.07, $0.11 per pound, respectively, over 1995-99 
(compared to $2.43 for yellow perch and $0.75 for whitefish).  The upshot is that 
increased abundance due to lower I&E losses would not be likely to increase catches 
much if at all.  Hence, there would be few if any direct benefits to commercial fishing 
from lowering I&E losses of these species.
5  Furthermore, a few hundred dollars worth of 
channel catfish (dockside value of $745 based on average 1995-99 prices) and burbot 
($127) can safely be ignored.
6 
 
                                                 
5 It is conceivable that commercial fishing could be positively or negatively affected through ecosystem 
effects.  If such impacts were identified, the methods proposed here could be applied. 
6 Prices here come from the National Marine Fisheries Service web site, 
http://www.st.nmfs.gov/st1/commercial/landings/gl_query.html 
  8That leaves white bass as the focal point for the analysis.  Let us assume that conditions 
in Great Lakes are currently similar to those in the 1970s (when the studies used by EPA 
to estimate losses were done) and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.  Thus 
we assume that average annual catches are about 1.7 million pounds with an ex vessel 
value of about $500,000.  These are the actual averages over the period beginning in 
1971 and ending in 1979.  If we assume that remediation is totally effective, this would 
mean an increase in annual catches of 230,000 pounds (Table 3) or about 14 percent.  
Applying the result from the Holt-Bishop model, that is, K = L, the estimated post-
harvest benefits would be 14 percent of ex vessel revenue or about $70,000 per year 
before adjusting for inflation. 
Conclusions 
For species and regions covered by empirical research like that found in Holt and Bishop 
(2002), post harvest changes in rents and consumer welfare from changes in catch can be 
addressed directly and should not be problematical.  Where such research results are not 
available and cannot be produced in a timely manner, the only recourse will be to benefits 
transfer.  Assuming that K = L in such cases seems to us to be a reasonable approach for 
now.  The robustness of this formula across Great Lakes and South Atlantic fisheries 
provides an adequate basis for proceeding in this way.  As more research becomes 
available, the formula may need to be modified or a new approach may present itself, but 
that is always the case with benefits transfer methods. 
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